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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the link between regulation, institutions, and telecommunications 
investment in Latin America. The investment levels of the region lag behind those of 
advanced economies and are impeding substantial progress on digital transformation. 
Using a database built for this analysis, which covers nearly 90% of Latin American 
countries for 2007-2017, we confirm the relevance of regulatory and institutional 
frameworks to explain investment trends in the sector. We also show that a “good” 
institutional quality contributes significantly to counteract partially a “bad” regulatory 
environment, and vice versa. Moreover, their impact is significantly stronger when good 
regulation and institutions interact, suggesting that joint reforms to improve institutions 
and the regulatory environment would pay off. In particular, improving cybersecurity and 
piracy control regulation, and fighting corruption and undue influence stand out as the 
priorities to increase telecommunication investment in Latin America. 
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What drives investment in telecommunications, and how can it be spurred in 
emerging countries? Can “good” institutions counteract the effects of “bad” 
regulations in the sector? Alternatively, do these countries need both modern 
institutions and adequate regulation to bridge the investment gaps vs the most 
advanced economies? These questions are addressed in the context of Latin 
America. 
Fostering the digital economy is a necessary condition to increase productivity in 
Latin America, a region characterized by low value-added activities. To stimulate its 
digital economy, a pressing challenge is closing its digital divide so that households, 
firms, and governments can thrive. As the Inter-American Development Bank 
showed in its latest flagship Development in the Americas 2020 (Cavallo et al, 2020), 
two reachable disruptions - increased digitalization of infrastructures and services, 
and the introduction of electric vehicles and car-sharing services through digital 
platforms - could boost Latin American GDP by 6.9% over 10 years. 
 
Given that access to telecommunications infrastructures and services is essential for 
this digitalization of the economy, this digital divide is impeding a massive 
transformation of production processes and public services, as well as inclusion 
possibilities for families, exacerbating current inequalities (OECD, 2020). Based on 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data, in 2019 there were still 27% 
of Latin Americans who did not used Internet, and more than half of the households 
did not have a fixed broadband connection.  
Raising the level of investment in telecommunications networks is therefore crucial 
to advance towards a more productive and inclusive Latin America. A conservative 
estimate by Analysis Mason for the Center of Latin American Telecommunication 
Studies (cet.la, 2019) stated that Latin America should invest a cumulative amount 
of USD 161 billion until 2025 (USD 61 billion over current trends) in order to achieve 
OECD levels of connectivity (namely 95% of the population covered by 4G, and 65% 
of households passed by fiber). Similarly, García Zaballos et al (2019) estimated that 
the main Latin America economies (not including Brazil) should invest between now 
and 2030 an additional USD 147.6 billion (i.e. between 20 and 40% vs current 
trends) to close key Sustainable Development Goals gaps (poverty, hunger, health, 
jobs, inequalities) vs OECD countries. 
Recent trends reported in Figure 1 confirm the existence of an investment gap with 
respect to OECD countries, despite the ongoing telecommunications industry efforts 








Figure 1. CAPEX per capita in telecommunications 
 
Note: CAPEX per capita at current USD prices (5-year average) 
Source: Katz and Jung (2020), from ITU data 
 
 
The main hypothesis in this paper is that the big investment effort required cannot 
arise without significant improvements in the macroeconomic and industry 
framework in Latin America. Institutional and regulatory contexts are a crucial 
factor considered in telecommunications investments, due to the long temporary 
horizon that conditions the industry decisions. It is worth to say that, in recent years, 
some countries have promoted important reforms in the sector. As highlighted by Prats and Puig (2017), approximately half of the region’s telecommunications and 
ICT laws were passed during the early 2000s. Just to mention a few examples, 
Mexico promoted a constitutional reform followed by the Ley Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión in 2014, aiming to develop a modern framework 
to enhance the dynamism of the market and the creation of the Instituto Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones (IFT). Similarly, Colombia was one of the first countries to 
create a specific ICT Ministry in 2009, and in 2019 approved the Ley de 
Modernización del Sector TIC, which creates a convergent national regulatory agency 
(NRA) and extends the spectrum license periods, among other reforms aiming to 
promote investments. Costa Rica, one of the regional technology leaders, promoted 
deep reforms with a change in its sectoral law in 2009, migrating from a state-
monopoly framework to an openness process with private competition.  
These efforts have surely contributed to explain the positive trend that investment 
exhibits in the region, but do not seem to be enough to catch up OECD countries. 
Evidence still shows that Latin America is lagging high-income countries in 
regulatory and institutional quality. In addition to the important internal disparities, 
it seems only regional leaders reach OECD levels (Figure 2). 
 
-- 4 -- 
 
 
Figure 2. Regulation and Institutional quality 
 
Source: CAF and WEF 
 
This paper analyses empirically the impact of institutions and regulation (using a 
variety of well-accepted measures of both) on investment levels in the 
telecommunications sector in Latin America. In order to do so, we built an original 
database covering 15 Latin American countries during the period 2007-2017. The 
analysis will pay particular attention to the interaction among policy measures that 
potentially explain investment trends in the telecommunication sector, shedding 
light on how institutional and regulatory quality could complement or substitute 
each other. In particular, the empirical analysis will test whether sound institutions are able to counteract the expected negative effects of “bad” regulations. The 
existence of an inclusive consultation process to all stakeholders on the 
implementation of a particular regulatory matter, or the access to an independent 
and efficient judicial systems are practical examples. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are no previous contributions in the empirical literature in Latin America on 
the complementary effects of institutions and regulation on telecom investments. 
Additionally, in order to be more policy-relevant, we will carry out a sensitivity 
analysis to get deeper into each of these areas to identify what ingredients in 
institutions and regulations matter the most. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review on 
the link between institutional and regulation quality and investment, with a focus 
on references covering the telecommunications and information technology sectors 
in Latin America. Section 3 presents a standard theoretical model designed to 
explain investment decisions in the industry. Section 4 describes the original dataset 
assembled and provides a descriptive analysis. Section 5 presents the main 
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2. Brief literature review 
 
The empirical literature on the role of regulation and governance on 
telecommunications and information technologies investment is relatively thin. In 
Latin America, from a policy perspective, Cavallo et al (2020) pointed to the 
combination of inadequate regulatory systems and supply and demand constraints 
as main reasons being the region´s investment gap. Its policy recommendations 
stress the need to create and implement digital agendas to achieve efficient 
coordination between all the economic sectors impacted by digital technologies, 
improving accountability and strengthening public institutions. This draws on a 
qualitative study by Prats and Puig (2017), who reported the regulatory and 
governance gaps in the telecommunication sector of the main economies in the 
region. These authors highlighted the relevance of regulation and institutions: 
updated IT laws, modern regulation of infrastructure development and access 
(spectrum, infrastructure sharing, universal service funds), and competition and 
consumer protection (concentration of broadband markets, access and 
interconnection, roaming and portability and data protection). On institutions, they 
point to a specialized IT Ministry/vice ministry, and an independent NRA. 
From a microeconomic perspective, Galperin (2017) analyzed empirically the 
determinants of lower connectivity among households in Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Peru., and  confirmed the relevance of low-investment low-competition 
factors as barriers, namely high connectivity costs and limited service availability; 
in addition to demand factors (e.g. limited awareness and low skills). The impact of 
high costs (driven by low competition) on the limited demand for broadband in 23 
countries in Latin America vs OECD countries was previously found by Galperin and 
Ruzzier (2013). 
 
Beyond Latin America, Alesina et al (2005) estimated and found a negative impact 
overall regulation in several sectors (including telecommunications) on investment 
for a sample of OECD countries from 1975 to 1998. That is, the more heavily 
regulated a sector is, the worse are the incentives for investment. Cambini and Jiang 
(2009) argued that regulation is a key driver of telecommunications investment, 
providing either incentives or disincentives, due to its incidence on firm financial 
choices.  
 
As for the institutional quality and telecommunications performance, Henisz and 
Zelner (2001) analyzed how differences in the political system affect service 
penetration for a sample of 147 countries during period 1960-1994. Similarly, 
Andonova (2006) found that Internet access depends strongly on the country's 
institutional quality, as fixed-line internet investment is characterized by a high risk 
of expropriation. Jung (2020) confirmed for a sample of 13 European countries 
during 2007–2015 the positive association between investment and institutional 
quality, notably property rights, corruption fight, judicial independence, and 
transparency.  
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Beyond the telecommunication sector, Andres et al (2008) built an index of 
regulatory governance and showed regulation and its governance mattered for 
performance of the electricity sector in Latin America. In particular, the existence of 
a regulatory agency, and looking deeper its autonomy, transparency, and 
accountability played a key role. More recently, Balza et al (2020) revisited the 
relationship between private participation, regulatory governance and the 
performance of the electricity sector in 18 Latin American countries between 1971 
and 2016. Regulatory and governance reforms paved the way for the private sector 
to become a crucial player in the Latin American electricity sector; and drove 




3. Theoretical model 
The baseline model used in the empirical estimates is inspired on the original 
framework proposed by Alesina et al (2005) for regulated sectors, used as a 
reference in diverse empirical researches (e.g. Eicher et al, 2006; Johansson et al, 
2008; Vartia, 2008). The model assumes that each sector in country i produces 
according to a linear and homogeneous production function with labor and physical 
capital as unique factors: 1 
                                             𝐹(𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖) = 𝐴𝐾𝑖𝛼𝐿𝑖1−𝛼 − 𝛷                                             [1] 
where K and L denote respectively physical capital stock and labor. All variables are 
defined at an aggregated sectoral level. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
labor is fixed. Therefore, firms choose the investment and capital levels to maximize 
the present discounted value of cash flow V: 
           𝑉𝑖 = ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 [𝐹(𝐾𝑖, 𝐿𝑖) − 𝑊𝐿𝑖 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 − 𝑒−𝜃𝑏𝑖2 (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝐾𝑖 )2 𝐾𝑖𝜎] 𝑑𝑡 ∞0            [2] 
where Wi, CAPEXi and ri denote average wages, investment, and the real interest rate, 
respectively. As in Alesina et al (2005), we will assume that wages and the real 
interest rate are exogenous and constant.2  
As shown in equation [2], each sector faces adjustment costs that follow the usual 
linear quadratic form. The term 𝑏𝑖 represents a measure of the framework quality 
under which the companies operate. Assuming𝜃 > 0, the better the environment (a 
larger 𝑏), the lower the adjustment costs that hamper the firm’s capacity to react to 
market changes.  
We will specify this function [2] for the telecommunications sector and assume that 𝑏 depends on the quality of regulation and institutions (following Henisz and Zelner, 
2001; Cambini and Jiang, 2009; Andonova and Diaz-Serrano, 2009). A suitable 
                                                          
1 As proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), the production function exhibits decreasing 
returns to each factor, while allowing the possibility of overall increasing returns, representing 𝛷 a 
positive constant which captures fixed costs, which are relevant in the telecommunications sector. 
2 In any case, any difference will be absorbed by the fixed effects. 
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regulatory framework, usually associated to flexible and business-prone 
environments, should favor telecommunications investment. On the contrary, rigid 
or strict regulations would increase adjustment costs and to decrease the expected 
return of investments, thus discouraging investments. Similarly, institutional 
quality (which ensure certainty and well-functioning government and regulatory 
bodies) is a key driver of investments, especially those related to the long run. 
Therefore, we will assume that “good” institutions contribute to reduce those 
adjustment costs, then having a positive impact on investment decisions. 
Investors maximize the present discounted value of cash flow 𝑉 exposed in equation 
[2] subject to the law-of-motion capital accumulation equation:                                                          
                                                   ?̇?𝑖 =  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 − 𝛿𝐾𝑖                                                 [3] 
where  𝛿  accounts for the depreciation rate of current capital stocks, assumed to be 
constant. Then, by introducing equation [1] in the cash flow represented in [2], and 
considering the capital accumulation expression reported in equation [3], the 
Hamiltonian that is subject to dynamic optimization can be expressed as: 𝐻𝑖 = 𝐴𝐾𝑖𝛼𝐿𝑖1−𝛼 − 𝛷 − 𝑊𝐿𝑖 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 − 𝑒−𝜃𝑏𝑖2 (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝐾𝑖 )2 𝐾𝑖𝜎 + λ[𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 − 𝛿𝐾𝑖 ] 
where λ is the shadow value of capital.  
Deriving the first order condition with respect to investment, and performing some 
basic algebra, we can deliver the following equation linking investment to the 
environmental quality: 
                                              𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 = (λ − 1)𝐾𝑖2−𝜎𝑒𝜃𝑏𝑖                                            [4] 
where we assume λ>1, as CAPEX cannot be negative. Expressing equation [4] in 
discrete terms, applying logarithms for linearization, renaming the constant term, 
and defining  𝛽 = 2 − 𝜎, we get the final specification for our empirical analysis: 
                              log (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡) = µ𝑖 + 𝛽log(𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝜃𝑏𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡                           [5] 
where i and t denote respectively the country and the year, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents an 
error term, assumed to verify the desired properties. The term µ𝑖  represents a 
country individual-effect, which captures all unobservable aspects that may impact 
investment decisions (typically time-invariant national idiosyncrasy, as well as scale 
differences among countries).  
Therefore, equation [5] defines CAPEX as a function that depends on the capital 
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4. Data 
The empirical analysis relies on an original dataset built for this paper, covering 15 
Latin American countries for the period 2007-2017 (Table 1).3 This panel 
represents 88.7% of the GDP and 89.3% of the population in Latin America, using 
World Bank Development Indicators.  
Table 1. Countries included in the sample 
Argentina Costa Rica Nicaragua 
Bolivia Dominican Republic Panama 
Brazil Ecuador Paraguay 
Chile Guatemala Peru 
Colombia Mexico Uruguay 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
 
Table 2 reports the definition and descriptive statistics of the main variables used 
in the empirical analysis. The dependent variable, CAPEX, comes from the ITU World 
Telecom / ICT Indicators database. Missing data was filled with information from the 
World Bank and Telecom Advisory Services estimates. As for the control variables, 
the measure of physical capital stock, K, was built applying the perpetual inventory 
methodology to the original CAPEX series.4  
To measure the quality of the regulation, we rely on the Public Policy and Regulation 
pillar from the Development Index of the Digital Ecosystem (CAF, 2017). The index, 
developed by Katz and Callorda (2018), has recently been updated. The Public Policy 
and Regulation pillar is built using two equally weighted sub-indexes: regulatory 
framework and competition. The regulatory sub-index measures regulatory 
maturity according to institutional and regulatory characteristics, as well as the 
degree of advance of the country in cybersecurity and piracy control. To account for 
institutional and regulatory characteristics, the index relies on the ITU – ICT 
Regulatory Tracker scores for the following clusters: Regulatory Authority, 
Regulatory Mandate, Regulatory Regime and Competition Framework. The 
competition sub-index is built using data of the concentration levels in several fixed 
and mobile telecommunications, and over-the-top (OTT) markets. To identify those countries that exhibit “good” regulation, we built a dummy variable that takes value 
of 1 if the respective observation is above the yearly median of the series 
                                                          
3 The original dataset included El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela. However, a preliminary 
descriptive analysis suggested their exclusion as their physical capital estimates behaved as outliers. 
These series and the database are available upon request. 
4 The followed procedure was similar to that applied in Balmaseda and Melguizo (2007).  The initial 
capital stock was computed as 𝐾0 = 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋0(𝑔+𝛿) , being 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋0 the first observation available for 
investment (in most cases dating before 1990) and 𝑔 the average growth rate of the respective series 
period. Once the initial capital stock was estimated, for the following periods the values were updated 
using the previous year CAPEX, to avoid any concerns regarding potential endogeneity among 
contemporaneous values. The depreciation rate considered was set at 𝛿 = 10%, following Martín 
and Velázquez (2001) and Keller (2001, 2002). The appendix includes a sensitivity using a faster 
depreciation rate of 15%. 
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distribution, and zero otherwise. Following the same criteria, we built dummies for 
each of the sub-components of the index to be used as sensitivity analysis.-- 
Table 2. Dataset and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Observations 
CAPEX 
(million USD) 
Investment in telecommunications in current 
dollars. Series compiled from International 
Telecommunications Union, World Bank and 





Physical capital stock of telecommunications 
sector. Built under the perpetual inventory 





Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the observation is over the yearly median in 





Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
the observation is over the yearly median in 













GDP per capita at constant dollars. Data from 













Percentage of country population living in 




Profit tax (%) 
Profit tax as a percentage of commercial 
profits. Data from World Bank – Doing Business  17.207 153 [8.060] 
Note: Standard deviation in brackets 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
Finally, in order to proxy institutional quality, we use the World Economic Forum 
(WEF, 2018) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), which assesses the competitiveness 
landscape of 137 economies since 2007. This index is composed by 12 pillars, being 
the first one that of public and private institutions. We will use the Public Institutions 
Indicator, which accounts for 75% of the Institutions Pillar of the GCI, to measure 
differences in institutional quality across countries. As on regulation, to identify 
those countries with “good” institutions, we built a dummy variable that takes value 
of 1 if the respective observation is above the yearly median of the index 
distribution, and zero otherwise. Following the same criteria, we will build dummies 
for each of the sub-components of the index, to provide more specific policy 
recommendations. 
We rely on dummy variables to account for regulatory and institutional quality 
based on the hypothesis that what matters the most to attract investments is the 
general perception of a country’s framework by the economic agents, rather than 
marginal increases in a score. Due to its own nature, the telecommunications sector 
is relatively concentrated and mostly composed by regional or global operators with 
presence in several countries, commonly viewing ‘’the map’’ of the region and 
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deciding how to prioritize investments.5 Econometrically, the use of dummy 
variables also mitigates multicollinearity problems6 
Figure 3 plots the kernel density functions for the CAPEX variable under the different 
scenarios of regulatory and institutional quality. In this descriptive analysis, the 
CAPEX variable is measured in per capita terms to avoid distortions due to country 
size. When comparing vis-à-vis the density function of those observations with “good” and “bad” institutions, the density function for the former scenario points to 
a larger investment intensity in those cases of better institutional environments 
(Panel A). In a less degree, the same pattern is evident for the case of regulation 
(Panel B). Panels C and D plot the density functions of observations which 
simultaneously exhibit “good” institutions and “good” regulation, in comparison 
with all the other three combinations (“good” & ”bad”; “bad” & “good”; “bad” & “bad”). Clearly, those countries with better institutional and regulatory frameworks 
have density functions shifted to the right, which suggest larger CAPEX intensity for 
those cases. This pattern is more pronounced in comparison with the individual 
analysis of “good” regulatory or institutional quality. Overall, these figures provide 
preliminary empirical evidence that countries with better regulation and 
institutions are the ones with larger investment levels in the telecommunications 
sector. 
Figure 3. Kernel density estimates for CAPEX per capita by regulation and 
institutional level 
 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
                                                          
5 However, we also tested intermediate options with dummies in three levels (above, average, low), 
but results were not conclusive, probably due to the limited size of the sample. 
6 Both regulatory and institutional indexes reported above are positively correlated (Pearson 
correlation index of 0.13, significant at a 10% level. In contrast, the transformation into dummy 
variables contributes to mitigate this problem, as correlation is no longer statistically significant. 
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Table 3. Descriptive of CAPEX per capita by regulation and institutional level 
Group Mean (CAPEX per capita) Different Mean Test 

























Bad Institutions & Bad Regulation 
25.536 
[13.246] 
Note: Standard deviations in brackets. In the mean difference tests, the null hypothesis refers to no difference 
in the mean of the two samples. *** Significant at 1% 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
In sum, all these correlation exercises are consistent with the main hypothesis of 
this paper, i.e. rules and institutions matter, and the interaction of good regulation 
and solid institutions is especially powerful to explain higher investments in 
telecommunications in Latin America. However, it remains to be seen if the link 
between CAPEX and the institutional and regulatory environments is merely a 
simple correlation, or if it is robust to the addition of other variables that affect 
investment decisions. This will be explored in Section 5. 
 
5. Results 
The empirical specification is derived from equation [5], which explains the level of 
investment in the telecommunications sector by the drivers set in the model 
described in Section 3.7 The CAPEX variable is measured in absolute terms as the 
individual effects and the physical capital stock variable account for differences in 
scale among countries. 8  
According to equation [5], the key to understand the link between CAPEX and the 
environment framework (simply put, rules and institutions) lies in the definition of 
the term 𝑏. In a first estimate, we will introduce individually the measures of “good” 
institutions and regulations, proxied by dummy variables. Furtherly, we will get 
deeper into the interaction effects between the two policy variables. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Following the related literature, we have also tested the model under some transformed 
specifications. See Appendix for further details and discussion. 
8 Rather than weighted by population as in the descriptive analysis.   
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5.1. Main results 
The first block of columns in Table 4 reports the results from the fixed-effects 
estimations of equation [5], accounting for country-level time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics. In column (i) we estimate the baseline specification 
with no time- effects and introducing individually the “good” institutions and “good” 
regulation variables. As expected, both institutional and regulatory variables exhibit 
a positive and significant coefficient, confirming the relevance of having a favorable 
framework (rules and/or institutions) to spur investment.9  
Column (ii) introduces the interactions between the institutional and regulatory 
variables. With respect to the baseline scenario (i.e. “bad” regulation and “bad” 
institutions), the sole presence of a “good” institutional quality contributes to 
counteract partially a “bad” regulatory environment (coefficients of +0.32). There 
are many possible mechanisms through which good institutions may “compensate” 
the effects of bad regulation. For instance, as adequate institutional framework, with 
public consultations to gather the view of all stakeholders, would allow a better 
implementation of the regulation by the NRA. ¿Additionally, the possibility of 
accessing to an independent justice system would open the possibility of 
stakeholders to challenge eventual harmful interventions from regulatory agents. 
The inverse relationship is also true, as a “good” regulatory framework has a 
positive impact on investment decisions (coefficient=+0.38) even in presence of “bad” institutions. Therefore, an investment-friendly regulation for 
telecommunications (e.g. eliminating red tape) might compensate the uncertainty 
driven by a weak institutional system in the country.  The coefficient difference 
checks confirm that the impact of improving regulations or institutions is positive, 
and the difference among both effects is not statistically different.  
When “good” institutions and regulations are present simultaneously, the positive 
effect in investment is much stronger in terms of magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient (as shown in column ii, the coefficient=+0.60 vs +0.32 with good 
institutions and +0.38 with good regulation). Further checks confirm that the 





                                                          
9
 It should be acknowledged that CAPEX series tend to be volatile due to specific infrastructure 
deployment plans that take place in periods over a single year. While we considered including the lag 
of CAPEX as a regressor to control for this particularity, we found this variable to be non-significant 
(see Appendix for full details and discussion). On the other hand, the presence of physical capital 
stock as a regressor contributes to control for this particularity. 
10 We carried out respective F-tests with the null hypothesis being that the correspondent 
coefficients were statistically equal. 
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Table 4. Drivers of telecommunication investment in Latin America  
(CAPEX, 2007-2017) 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) 
Log(K) 
0.390** 0.393*** 0.075 -0.196     
[0.133] [0.124] [0.233] [0.195]     
Good Institutions 
0.264**        
[0.105]        
Good Regulation 
0.328**        
[0.140]        
Good Institutions and 
Bad Regulation (η)  0.316* 0.342** 0.347** 0.349** 0.332** 0.366** 0.340***  [0.165] [0.154] [0.124] [0.149] [0.120] [0.148] [0.119] 
Bad Institutions and 
Good Regulation (ρ)  0.383* 0.403** 0.507** 0.411** 0.479** 0.437*** 0.467***  [0.195] [0.167] [0.192] [0.164] [0.185] [0.162] [0.180] 
Good Institutions and 
Good Regulation (𝛶)  0.602** 0.631*** 0.687*** 0.644*** 0.656*** 0.673*** 0.639***  [0.222] [0.176] [0.191] [0.179] [0.198] [0.178] [0.194] 
Log(GDP per capita)t-1 
   1.142**  0.967**  0.954** 
   [0.512]  [0.446]  [0.380] 
Rural population 
   0.025  0.026  0.004 
      [0.049]   [0.056]   [0.036] 
H0: η=ρ n.a. 0.26 0.28 1.12 0.30 0.89 0.35 0.67 
H0: η=𝛶 n.a. 3.45* 6.98** 4.78** 6.69** 3.44* 6.29** 3.13* 
H0: 𝛶=ρ n.a. 3.68* 5.45** 3.08 5.28** 2.93 5.08** 3.10* 
Hausman Test 25.68*** 26.24*** 22.11* 33.86*** 0.86 0.69 n.a. n.a. 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO 
Random Effects NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Year Effects NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
 
Additional estimates reported in columns (iii) and (iv), introduce further regressors 
to control for omitted variables and confirm the robustness of our results. In (iii) we 
added year-fixed effects to control for external shocks and the economic cycle. We 
also included GDP per capita (to proxy for demand-shifter factors), and the 
percentage of rural population (as a cost-shifter for telecommunication network 
deployments). GDP per capita is introduced with a one-period time-lag to avoid 
reverse causality with the dependent variable. In both cases, focusing on the policy 
variables, the level and significance of the institutional and regulation regressors are 
even stronger than in specification (ii). Note physical capital loses significance when 
introducing these additional controls (in particular year fixed effects), probably due 
to the fact that capital varies little over time.11  
Therefore, we replicate the estimates in columns (v) and (vi) omitting the capital 
variable. Results again hold, confirming that “good” institutions contribute to 
                                                          
11 This is also the case when we consider a 15% depreciation rate for capital. See robustness checks 
in the Appendix. 
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counteract partially a “bad” regulatory environment (and the other way around), 
and there is a clear interaction effect between both variables. Taking into account 
the most conservative result (that reported in column ii), countries belonging to the “good” institutions and “bad” regulation group invest 31.6% more than those with “bad” & “bad” characteristics. Similarly, countries with “bad” institutions and “good” 
regulation invest 38.3% more than those from the baseline scenario. Finally, the 
interaction effect points out that countries exhibiting both “good” & “good” 
characteristics invest a 60.2% more than those within the “bad” & “bad” category. If 
all countries of the region belonged to the “good” & “good” category, overall telecom 
investment in Latin America will increase in 13.5% according to these estimates. 
The second block of columns of Table 4 replicate the former estimates through the 
random effects model, as recommended by the Hausman test. Results reported in 
columns (vii) and (viii) are similar to the previous estimates.  
Overall, our empirical analysis confirms that both institutional and regulatory 
quality are relevant to explain telecommunications investment in Latin America 
between 2007 and 2017. The effect is stronger when both policy areas interact (the 
positive impact of institutions ranges from +0.32 to +0.37; in the case of regulations 
from +0.38 to +0.51; when both regulation and institutions are good, +0.60 to 
+0.69). In short, while “good” institutions (regulation) partially counteract the 
effects of a “bad” regulation (institutions), the effect is enhanced when both are 
present simultaneously. The next sub-section will get deeper in order to identify 
which regulatory and institutional areas are more relevant. 
 
5.2. Sensitivity analysis 
  
In order to be more policy specific, we also performed additional empirical tests 
using sub-indexes for regulation and institutions. Table 5 details the components we 
will focus on, following standard recommendations of the literature (see also 
Section 3). 
The analysis focuses initially on the regulatory components, keeping the original 
institutional aggregate index. Regulatory sub-components will be introduced one by one, using dummies for above/below the median (“good”/”bad”). For the sake of 
simplicity, we will perform these estimates based only in our preferred estimate 
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 Regulatory Maturity (index built from data assessing the authority of the 
national regulatory authority, the regulatory regime and framework, and 
the competition model index) 
 Cybersecurity and piracy (index built using the percentage of licensed 
software and a measure of cybernetic security) 
 Competition (index built from the concentration levels of fixed and 





 Property rights (built on measures of property rights and intellectual 
property protection) 
 Ethics and corruption fight (built from assessments on the diversion of 
public funds, public trust in politicians, and irregular payments and 
bribes) 
 Undue influence (refers to judicial independence and favoritism in 
decisions of government officials) 
 Government efficiency (refers to the wastefulness of government 
spending, the burden of government regulation, the efficiency of legal 
framework in settling disputes and challenging regulations, and the 
transparency of government policymaking) 
 Security (built after estimates of the business costs of terrorism, crime 
and violence, organized crime, and a measure of the reliability of police 
services) 
Source: Authors own elaboration based on CAF and WEF data 
 
Table 6. Drivers of telecommunication investment in Latin America 
Focus on regulatory sub-components (CAPEX, 2007-2017) 
  (i) (ii) (iii) 
Good Institutions and Bad Regulatory Maturity 
0.298**   
[0.125]   
Bad Institutions and Good Regulatory Maturity 
0.369**   
[0.155]   
Good Institutions and Good Regulatory Maturity 
0.425***   
[0.129]   
Good Institutions and Bad Cybersecurity and Piracy Control 
 0.214  
 [0.161]  
Bad Institutions and Good Cybersecurity and Piracy Control 
 0.524***  
 [0.148]  
Good Institutions and Good Cybersecurity and Piracy 
Control 
 0.593***  
 [0.169]  
Good Institutions and Bad Competition (fixed, mobile, OTT) 
  0.200* 
  [0.115] 
Bad Institutions and Good Competition (fixed, mobile, OTT) 
  0.249 
  [0.173] 
Good Institutions and Good Competition (fixed, mobile, OTT) 
  0.438*** 
  [0.158] 
Log(GDP per capita)t-1 
0.987*** 0.880** 0.860** 
[0.384] [0.389] [0.344] 
Rural population 
-0.013 -0.019 -0.007 
[0.031] [0.030] [0.029] 
Random Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 137 137 154 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
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 Results suggest that “good” institutions cannot compensate the negative effects on 
investment of an inadequate cybersecurity and piracy control (coefficient=+0.21 but 
not significant), and only weakly if competition is low, suggesting these areas should be prioritized in the regulation agenda. On the contrary, “good” institutions compensate the impact of “bad” regulatory maturity. A “good” regulatory maturity and a “good” cybersecurity and piracy framework 
have, respectively, a positive link with investments despite the eventual presence of 
poor institutions. Finally, in all cases, the interaction among the respective 
regulatory variables and “good” institutions stands. The best returns (i.e. higher telecommunication investment) stem from “good” institutions and “good” 
cybersecurity and piracy control (coefficient=+0.59). 
Table 7 reports a similar exercise, keeping the aggregate regulatory variable while 
individually introducing the institutional sub-components. “Good” regulation 
cannot compensate a weak property rights regime nor lack of security, advising to 
improve these institutional features as a priority according to the business sector in 
Latin America (coefficients are +0.37 not significant, and +0.27 not significant at 
5%).  
Again, in all the reported cases, the interaction among the respective institutional variables and “good” regulation holds, supporting once again that the stronger effects for investment happen when “good” rules and institutions appear together. The best returns stem from the combination of “good” regulation and lack of undue 
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Table 7. Drivers of telecommunication investment in Latin America 
Focus on institutional sub-components 
(CAPEX, 2007-2017) 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Good Regulation and Bad Property Rights 
0.372     
[0.234]     
Bad Regulation and Good Property Rights 
0.117     
[0.259]     
Good Regulation and Good Property Rights 
0.420*     
[0.223]     
Good Regulation and Bad Ethics and Corruption Fight 
 0.428***    
 [0.154]    
Bad Regulation and Good Ethics and Corruption Fight 
 0.209*    
 [0.115]    
Good Regulation and Good Ethics and Corruption 
Fight 
 0.478***    
 [0.189]    
Good Regulation and Bad Undue Influence 
  0.474**   
  [0.217]   
Bad Regulation and Good Undue Influence 
  0.315*   
  [0.186]   
Good Regulation and Good Undue Influence 
  0.621***   
  [0.235]   
Good Regulation and Bad Government Efficiency 
   0.410**  
   [0.167]  
Bad Regulation and Good Government Efficiency 
   0.137  
   [0.105]  
Good Regulation and Good Government Efficiency 
   0.406**  
   [0.186]  
Good Regulation and Bad Security 
    0.271* 
    [0.142] 
Bad Regulation and Good Security 
    0.155 
    [0.255] 
Good Regulation and Good Security 
    0.496* 
    [0.277] 
Log(GDP per capita)t-1 
1.025** 0.955** 1.010** 0.998** 0.878** 
[0.429] [0.400] [0.401] [0.436] [0.384] 
Rural population 
0.005 0.004 0.007 0.003 -0.006 
[0.038] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038] [0.037] 
Random Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 





This paper analyzes the link between regulation, institutions, and 
telecommunications investment in Latin America. Increasing digital connectivity ¿ 
is an economic priority for the region, in order to spur productivity and 
inclusiveness. All available estimates suggest that investment in 
telecommunications should increase significantly to reduce the gap versus not only 
high-income economies, but also the dynamic Asian economies. 
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Using a novel database built for the analysis covering 15 Latin American economies 
(nearly 90% of the regional GDP and population) during 2007-2017, our results 
confirm that regulatory and institutional frameworks are key to explain investment 
levels in telecommunications. We also show that a “good” institutional quality contributes significantly to counteract partially a “bad” regulatory environment and 
the other way around.  
The interaction of good regulations and institutions would pay off significantly even 
more. Therefore, for the region to foster telecommunications investment and close 
the digital divide, significant advances are needed in both fronts. Going more 
granular, on the regulatory front a clear priority is improving cybersecurity and 
piracy control, as good institutions could compensate their negative effects, and 
those countries with “good” cybersecurity and piracy control show higher 
investments even in presence of poor institutions. In the case of institutions, ethics 
and corruption fight, and undue influences stand out. 
As usual, these results should be taken with caution. Our sample, despite being rich 
enough to capture Latin American heterogeneity and representative of the region in 
terms of GDP and population, and cover a key period for the industry, is relatively 
small. An extension of the paper could be to expand the time series for the Latin 
American countries, and combine them with other emerging and high-income 
regions (Asia, Europe and North America). This could enrich the policy implications, 
as some of these countries would show good practices in both regulations and 
institutions. In addition, further robustness checks could be done using additional 
measures of institutional and regulatory quality.  
On the other hand, data availability restricted us to work with sector-aggregated 
information, as we were unable to split our main variables across telecom operators, 
or for mobile and fixed services. That prevented us to decode further insights about 
possible differences between services, or among incumbents and challengers in 
terms of investment dynamics. Similarly, the lack of reliable panel data on sectoral 
taxes prevented us to get deeper into the role of taxes on investment decisions.  
Finally, further extensions could exploit in more detail the time-dimension of the 
data. Regulatory and institutional reforms usually take some time to happen. 
Moreover, once institutional reforms are put in place, it may take a while before the 
economic agents fully internalize those changes and decide to invest more. How long 
do the markets take to react to framework reforms? That temporal dimension was 
not considered in our analysis but should be addressed in the future when richer 
datasets become available. All these are natural extension of our research. 
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Appendix. Further empirical analysis 
 
i.  Controlling for CAPEX volatility 
CAPEX series may be very volatile due to specific infrastructure deployment plans 
that take place in periods over a single year. To control for this particularity, we 
conducted a robustness check by replicating estimation (i) in Table 4, adding the 
lagged CAPEX as a regressor (see Table A.1).  
 
Table A.1. Estimation controlling for previous CAPEX (2007-2017) 















Fixed Effects YES NO 
Observations 139 123 
Estimation Method OLS-FE 
GMM  
(Arellano-Bond) 
Note: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** 
Significant at 1% 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
 
Column (i) report fixed effects estimations and show the lagged dependent variable 
to be not significant. However, the fixed effects approach may not be appropriate to 
perform this estimate, as the introduction of the lagged dependent variable as 
regressor can generate correlation with the fixed effects in the error term. This situation creates a “dynamic panel bias” (Nickell, 1981), as the reported correlation 
violates the necessary assumptions for consistency in OLS estimators. The dynamic 
panel GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) provides consistent 
estimates under these circumstances; see column (ii). Instruments used for the 
differenced equation were the lagged dependent variable after second lags (GMM-
style instruments), and the remaining covariates as standard instruments. Again, 
the lagged dependent variable is not significant. On the other hand, the presence of 
physical capital stock as a regressor seems to control for this particularity. Overall, 
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ii. Alternative specifications of the model 
Alesina et al (2005) and Eicher et al (2006) estimated a transformed specification of 
equation [5], using the ratio CAPEX – Capital (which implies to assume 𝜎 = 1 in 
equation [4]) as the dependent variable, and adding a lag of the dependent variable 
as a regressor to control for past investment intensity. Following these criteria, the 
empirical specification is represented as:  
                       log (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡/𝐾𝑖𝑡) = µ𝑖 + 𝜓log (𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡−1/𝐾𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝑏𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡           [5’] 
Estimation results are reported in Table A. 2. Columns (i) and (ii) report fixed effects 
estimations and show the lagged dependent variable to be not significant. However, 
the fixed effects approach may not be appropriate to estimate equation [5’], due to 
the “dynamic panel bias” explained above.  By performing the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) estimates, the results reported in columns (iii) and (iv) show again that the 
lagged dependent variable is not significant. In addition to that, the implied 𝜎 in the 
estimates reported in Table 4 was never close to 1, as required to perform the 
transformation. Overall, this evidence provides support to the specification followed 
in the main text.  
Table A.2. Alternative specifications of the model (CAPEX/K 2007-2017) 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Dependent variable: Log(CAPEX/K) Log(CAPEX/K) Log(CAPEX/K) Log(CAPEX/K) 
Log(CAPEX/K)t-1 
0.132 0.127 -0.036 -0.042 
[0.086] [0.088] [0.084] [0.085] 
Good Institutions and Bad Regulation  
0.152 0.135 -0.036 -0.107 
[0.169] [0.170] [0.178] [0.180] 
Bad Institutions and Good Regulation  
0.262 0.292 0.368* 0.399* 
[0.189] [0.191] [0.212] [0.215] 
Good Institutions and Good Regulation 
0.583*** 0.642*** 0.559** 0.587*** 
[0.207] [0.214] [0.220] [0.225] 
Log(GDP per capita)t-1 
 0.038  -1.509** 
 [0.463]  [0.595] 
Rural population 
 0.068  0.040 
 [0.055]  [0.063] 
Fixed Effects YES YES NO NO 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 139 139 123 123 





Note: Standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
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iii. Alternative estimate of physical capital (δ=15%) 
As an additional robustness check, we built an alternative physical capital series 
using a 15% depreciation rate, as a reflection of the higher turnout of new 
technologies. Table A.3 replicates Table 4 specifications, obtaining similar results. 
Table A.3. Drivers of telecommunication investment in Latin America  
(CAPEX 2007-2017; δ=15%) 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Log(K) - with δ=15% 0.381*** 0.383*** 0.068 -0.229 
[0.127] [0.119] [0.202] [0.177] 
Good Institutions 
0.260**    
[0.106]    
Good Regulation 
0.330**    
[0.138]    
Good Institutions and Bad Regulation  
 0.310* 0.342** 0.352** 
 [0.165] [0.154] [0.124] 
Bad Institutions and Good Regulation  
 0.382* 0.404** 0.514** 
 [0.194] [0.167] [0.194] 
Good Institutions and Good Regulation  
 0.599** 0.631*** 0.696*** 
 [0.223] [0.177] [0.191] 
Log(GDP per capita)t-1 
   1.187** 
   [0.538] 
Rural population 
   0.027 
      [0.047] 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects NO NO YES YES 
Observations 154 154 154 154 
Note: Robust standard Errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 
1%. 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
 
iv. Controlling for corporate taxation 
Taxation is potentially a relevant factor to influence v investment decisions. A recent 
research carried out by Katz and Callorda (2019) for the United Sates found that a 
decrease of 1% in the average weighted state and local sales tax rate affecting initial 
equipment purchases would increase investment by 2%. Specifically, for Latin 
America, taxation is claimed to be a constraining factor inhibiting investments, due 
to the relatively high fiscal pressure borne by the sector. A seminal paper by Katz et 
al (2017) showed that in Latin America taxation borne by the telecommunication 
sector is significantly higher than the economy average (12,1% vs 8,0% of value 
added in 2011).  Unfortunately, we are not aware of any reliable panel data on 
taxation on telecommunications for the region. The best source would be GSMA 
(2019), covering general and sector-specific tax payments on the mobile sector for 
15 countries in Latin America, but it is only referred to the year 2017. So we relied, 
as an admittedly imperfect proxy, on the series of profit taxes for the aggregate 
economy as a percentage of commercial profits, taken from the World Bank – Doing 
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Business dataset.  We replicate in Table A.4 the estimates reported in columns (v) to 
(viii) in Table 4. Results suggest that taxation pressure discourages investment 
(regressor statistically significant in both fixed effects estimates) although loses 
significance with random effects). More relevant, controlling for the level of 
corporate taxation, the relevance of the institutional and regulatory frameworks to 
explain telecommunication investment is confirmed once again. 
Table A.4. Drivers of telecommunication investment in Latin America 
Controlling for corporate taxation 
(CAPEX, 2007-2017) 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Good Institutions and Bad 
Regulation  
0.340** 0.330** 0.381** 0.344*** 
(0.159) (0.117) (0.152) (0.119) 
Bad Institutions and Good 
Regulation  
0.410** 0.462** 0.477*** 0.453** 
(0.177) (0.187) (0.166) (0.181) 
Good Institutions and Good 
Regulation  
0.598*** 0.619*** 0.673*** 0.601*** 
(0.166) (0.177) (0.170) (0.191) 
Profit tax  
-0.063*** -0.060*** -0.031 -0.027 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) 
Log(GDP per capita)t-1 
 1.169**  0.898** 
 (0.462)  (0.368) 
Rural population 
 0.025  -0.005 
 (0.055)  (0.034) 
Fixed Effects YES YES NO NO 
Random Effects NO NO YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 142 142 142 142 
Note: Robust Standard Errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 
Source: Authors own elaboration 
